Abstract. Formal Interactive Epistemology deals with the logic of knowledge and belief when there is more than one agent or``player.'' One is interested not only in each person's knowledge and beliefs about substantive matters, but also in his knowledge and beliefs about the others' knowledge and beliefs. This paper examines two parallel approaches to the subject. The ®rst is the semantic, in which knowledge and beliefs are represented by a space of states of the world, and for each player i, partitions I i of and probability distributions p i Á Y o on for each state o of the world. The atom of I i containing a given state o represents i's knowledge at that state ± the set of those other states that i cannot distinguish from o; the probability distributions p i Á Y o represents i's beliefs at the state o. The second is the syntactic approach, in which beliefs are embodied in sentences constructed according to certain syntactic rules. This paper examines the relation between the two approaches, and shows that they are in a sense equivalent.
Introduction
In interactive contexts like game theory and economics, it is important to consider what each player knows and believes about what the other players know and believe. Two di¨erent formalisms ± the semantic and the syntactic ± are available for this purpose. A companion paper (Aumann 1999, henceforth [A] ) discusses and relates the two formalisms in the context of knowledge.
Here we extend that analysis to include issues of belief ± i.e., probability.
The semantic formalism consists of a``partition structure.'' For knowledge only [A] , this consists of a space of states of the world (or simply states), together with a partition of for each player i. To deal with probability as well, one adds a probability distribution p i Á Y o on for each player i and each state o. The atoms of i's partition are his information sets1; is called the universe. Like in probability theory, events are subsets2 of ; intuitively, an event E is identi®ed with the set of all those states at which the event obtains. Thus E obtains at a state o if and only if o e E. Player i's probability for event E at state o is represented by p i EY o. If is between 0 and 1 and E is an event, then``i's probability for E is at least '' is itself an event, denoted P i E; explicitly, it is the set of all states o at which p i EY o . Similarly,``i knows E'' is an event, denoted K i E; explicitly, o is in K i E if and only if the information set of i containing o is included in E.
The syntactic formalism, on the other hand, is built on propositions, expressed in a formal language. The language has logical operators and connectives, operators k i expressing knowledge, and operators p i expressing beliefs. If e is a sentence, then k i e and p i e are also sentences; k i e means``i knows, e,'' and p i e means``i has probability at least for e.'' The operators k i and p i can be iterated: The sentence k j p i e means``j knows that i's probability for j knowing e is at least .'' Logical relations between the various propositions are expressed by formal rules.
There is a rough correspondence between the two formalisms: Events correspond to sentences, unions to disjunctions, intersections to conjunctions, inclusions to implications, complementation to negation, semantic knowledge operators K i and belief operators P i to syntactic knowledge operators k i and belief operators p i . But the correspondence really is quite rough; for example, only some ± not all ± events correspond to syntactically admissible sentences.
While the semantic formalism is the more convenient and widely used of the two, it is conceptually not quite straightforward. One question that often arises is, what do the players know about the formalism itself? Does each know the others' partitions, and does he know the others' probability measures as functions of o? If so, from where does this knowledge derive?
1 I.e., he can distinguish between states o and o H if and only if they are in di¨erent atoms of his partition. 2 But unlike in [A] , not every subset of is an event; certain measurability conditions must be met. See Section 1.
For the case of knowledge, this question is answered by constructing a unique canonical semantic partition structure, in terms of the syntactic formalism; see [A] . The main purpose of this paper is to do the same in the expanded context that includes also probability.
The underlying idea is as in [A] . A state o in the canonical semantic formalism is de®ned as a list of (syntactic) sentences that is complete and consistent in the appropriate senses; intuitively, the list is the set of all sentences that`h old at'' o. Also as in [A] , the concept of a semantic model for a list of sentences plays a central role; a list is consistent if and only if it has a model.
But there are some signi®cant divergences from [A] . For one thing, probability involves measurability; though this o¨ers no particular di½culty, it must be dealt with. More important, in [A] the de®nition of``consistency'' is syntactic, and one proves that a list of sentences is consistent if and only if it has a model. Here ± in the context of probability ± we did not succeed in formulating a satisfactory syntactic de®nition of consistency that would enable the proof of such a result. We therefore de®ne a consistent list of sentences as one that has a model. This and other conceptual issues will be discussed in Sections 15 and 17.
While we have tried to make this paper self-contained, it does have important ties to [A], both conceptual and formal. To make it easier to refer to [A], we continue [A]'s numbering system here: The current paper starts with Section 11, so that a reference to 1.8, say, refers to [A] . For notations that are not explained here, the reader is referred to [A] .
The remaining sections are numbered roughly as in [A] , with the number 10 added. Thus Section 12 here describes the semantic knowledge-belief formalism, whereas Section 2 in [A] describes the (multi-player) semantic knowledge formalism. Sections 13 and 3 are conceptual discussions of the semantic formalisms. Sections 14 and 4 respectively set forth the syntactic knowledge-belief formalism, and the syntactic knowledge formalism; Sections 15 and 5 discuss these constructions. Sections 16 and 6 respectively construct the canonical semantic knowledge-belief and knowledge systems; again, Sections 17 and 7 discuss these constructions. Like Sections 8 and 9, Sections 18 and 19 explore and justify the foregoing material, using mathematical tools. Speci®cally, we show that there is a rough``isomorphism'' between the two formalisms, similar to that established in Section 8 for the case of knowledge. Also, we show that the canonical system constructed in Section 16 is indeed a knowledge-belief system as de®ned in Section 12 (the corresponding statement for knowledge systems is immediate). The paper closes with a discussion in Section 20, roughly parallel to the discussion of knowledge formalisms in Section 10.
Semantic knowledge-belief formalisms
Recall that a semantic knowledge system (Section 2) consists of a universe , a population N, and a knowledge function k i for each individual i in N. De®ne a ®nite semantic knowledge-belief system to consist of a semantic knowledge system with a ®nite universe, and, for each individual i and state o, a probability measure p i Á Y o on the ®eld E of subsets of (called events). The interpretation is that at state o, individual i ascribes probability p i EY o to event E. Set
P i E is the event that i ascribes probability at least to E. Assume that
Intuitively, 12.2 says that if i knows something, then he assigns it probability 1; 12.3, that he knows the probabilities that he assigns to events. Technically, 12.2 says that
In the general (not necessarily ®nite) case, de®ne a knowledge-belief system as a knowledge system fY NY fk i g i e N gg, together with a sigma-®eld F s of sets in (called events), and, for each individual i and state o, a probability measure p i Á Y o on F s such that the atoms of the I i are F s -measurableY and 12X4
As before, p i EY o signi®es i's probability for E at o; and we assume 12.2 and 12.3, where P i is de®ned by 12.1. For future reference, note that
Indeed, ®x o, i and E. By 12.1, for any (not necessarily rational) we have
Therefore p i EY o is any rational for which o e P i E, which establishes in 12.6. On the other hand, if a rational is p i EY o, then by 12.7, o e P i E, so supf X o e P i Eg; this establishes in 12.6. 9
Discussion
First, note that as presented here, the beliefs of the players depend explicitly on their information; in e¨ect, each player's probability is concentrated on his information set. This is in contrast to formulations (e.g., Aumann (1987) ) in which the probability distributions are initially given on the entire state space , and then the players compute posterior probabilities, conditional on their information. Proceeding as we do here emphasizes that we are analyzing a single moment of time, at which the players have the information that they have; we are interested in the beliefs of the players at that time, and at that time only.
Next, the conceptual issues discussed in Section 3 arise here also. Basically, the problem is to justify the implicit assumption that the players know the model itself, including the partitions of the other players and their probability distributions (for each of their information sets). The problem could be resolved by presenting an explicit canonical semantic formalism, with explicit descriptions of the states, partitions, and probabilities. This, indeed, is what we do in Section 16.
The syntactic knowledge±belief formalism
Start with a ®nite population N, and a keyboard consisting of an alphabet X X fxY yY zY F F Fg and the symbols RY X Y Y Y k i , and p i , where i ranges over the individuals in N and over the rationals between 0 and 1 inclusive. A formula is de®ned as a ®nite string of symbols obtained by applying ®nitely often, in some order, the following rules:
Every letter in the alphabet is a formulaX 14X1
If f and g are formulasY so is f R gX 14X2
If f is a formulaY so are X f Y k i f Y and p i f for each i and each X 14X3
We often omit parentheses, and in particular write p i f for p i f ; intuitively, p i f means``i ascribes probability at least to f.'' Adding the probability operators p i to the language enables us to refer to the players' beliefs, in addition to the elements treated in Section 4.
The set of all formulas with the given population N and alphabet X is called a syntax, and is denoted SNY X, or just S. Assume that N and X are ®nite or denumerable; it follows that S is denumerable. De®ne a representation of S as a knowledge±belief system, , together with a function j X S 3 F s such that for all f Y gY i, and ,
where F s is the s-®eld of events in , and K i , P i , are the corresponding semantic knowledge and belief operators. Given a representation Y j and a
A model for L is a representation j and a state o in such that every formula in the list holds at o. A formula f is a consequence of (or follows from) L if every model for L is also a model for f f g.
Discussion
In Section 5 we discussed and interpreted the syntax of pure knowledge, as set forth in Section 4; much of that discussion applies, mutatis mutandis, to the knowledge-belief syntax set forth in Section 14.
Each of these two syntaxes provides both a grammar and a logic. The grammar tells us how to construct``well-formed formulas,'' i.e., meaningful sentences; the logic, how to deduce formulas from one another.
The two grammars are entirely analogous. Both are embodied in the descriptions of the keyboards, and in the rules for constructing formulas from keyboard elements (14.1 through 14.3 for knowledge-belief, 4.1 through 4.3 for knowledge). Indeed, the only di¨erence is that the knowledge-belief grammar has probability operators p i in addition to the other elements. But the two logics are quite di¨erent, in several ways. In Section 4 ± which treats knowledge only ± the fundamental notion of consequence is de®ned in purely syntactic terms: g is a consequence of f if it follows from f by repeated use of certain axioms and rules of deduction4. Moreover, it is ®nitary, in that the hypothesis comprises just one formula f; and though one can speak of g following from a list L of formulas, that is tantamount to g following from a conjunction of ®nitely many formulas in L.
In contrast, in Section 14 the notion of consequence is in®nitary: A formula can follow from a list L without following from any ®nite sublist. For example, p 1a2 x follows from all the p x with `1a2, but not from any ®nite number of them. Moreover, the de®nition is no longer purely syntactic; it involves``models,'' which are essentially semantic.
While these di¨erences are conceptually signi®cant, their practical e¨ect is limited. Though in®nitary deductions are in principle possible, we know of none in actual game-theoretic or economic applications of epistemological formalisms. As for the issue of syntax versus semantics in de®ning``consequence,'' practically speaking it shouldn't matter. In the case of knowledge, it indeed doesn't matter; by 9.4, the two approaches are equivalent. In the case of probability (knowledge-belief ), we have not succeeded in developing a deductive logic that allows us to establish such a result formally. Conceptually, it would certainly be desirable to do so; and for a``purely'' syntactic logic, without any semantic component, it is indispensable. But even without this, the de®nition of tautology in Section 14 does, practically speaking, provide a coherent logic for the syntactic grammar.
Section 16 uses the syntactic formalism of Section 14 to construct an explicit canonical semantic knowledge-belief system. But it should be remembered that the syntactic formalism is important not only as a tool for constructing the canonical semantic formalism, but also in its own right, as a formalism of deduction. In this formalism, there are no explicit states; one simply deduces true statements from other true statements. As noted in the introduction, this mode of deduction is in a sense more compelling ± has more immediacy ± than the semantic mode.
The canonical semantic knowledge-belief system
As in Section 14, assume given a ®nite population N and an alphabet X. Call a list L of formulas closed if it contains all its consequences; coherent, if
A state is a closed, coherent, and complete list. Denote the set of all states NY X, or simply . For all individuals i, de®ne a knowledge function k i on by specifying that for all states o, k i o is the set of all formulas in o that start with k i X 16X3
For each formula f, de®ne an event E f (a subset of ) by
Let F s be the s-®eld generated5 by the events E f . For each f, i, and o, de®ne
We will show below (Section 18) that p i Á Y o is well-de®ned on the events E f for each o and i, and extends uniquely to a s-additive probability measure on F s , which is also denoted p i Á Y o; moreover (Section 19), that the system comprising , the k i , the s-®eld F s , and the probability measures p i Á Y o satis®es 12.2 through 12.5, and so is a knowledge-belief system. We call it the canonical semantic knowledge-belief system for NY X, or simply the canonical system.
Discussion
As before, much of the discussion of the canonical semantic knowledge formalism applies, mutatis mutandis, also here; see Section 7. We have seen (Section 15) that the logic of the syntactic knowledge-belief formalism depends on the notion of a semantic model, and so is not``purely'' syntactic. This raises the question as to whether there is not some kind of circularity implicit in our construction of the canonical semantic formalism.
The answer is``no''. Our aim, as stated at the end of Section 13, is to present an explicit canonical semantic formalism, with explicit descriptions of the states, partitions, and probabilities. The construction in Section 16 accomplishes this in a coherent and valid manner.
The canonical probabilities are well-de®ned and superadditive
Throughout this section and the next, o denotes a state in the canonical system. In this section we prove that p i Á Y o is well-de®ned on the events E f (18.32), that it is ®nitely additive (18.4), that it extends uniquely to a sigmaadditive measure on F s (18.56), and that it is a probability measure (18.6). In the process, we will begin, in the current knowledge-belief context, to establish a correspondence between syntax and semantics analogous to that established in Section 8 in the context of knowledge (18.1).
Let x be in the alphabet. Since o is coherent, either X x f o or x f o. Suppose w.l.o.g. that x f o. Since o is closed, x is not a consequence of o. Thus it is not true that every model for o is also a model for x. So there is a model for o that is not a model for x. In particular, there is a model for o; denote it Y jY o. Let p i Á Y o be the probabilities of i in at o. Call an event of the form E f syntactic, and denote the family of syntactic events by F.
Proposition 18.1.
Proof: Analogous to that of 8.3, and so omitted.
Corollary 18.14. The family F of syntactic events is a ®eld; that is, it is closed under complementation, ®nite unions, and ®nite intersections.
Lemma 18.2.
Proof: Suppose it is not the case that j f r jg; i.e., that there is an element n of j f njg. Let n be the list of all formulas that hold at n. Then n is a consistent and complete list ± i.e., a state in the canonical system . By construction, f e n and g f n, and the existence of such a state is incompatible with E f r E g . This establishes 18.21.
The``only if '' part of 18.22 is what we mean by saying that Y jY o is a model for o. For the``if '' part, let f f o. Then X f e o by completeness (16.2). So by the``only if '' part, o e jX f dj f ; that is, o f j f . This proves the contrapositive of the``if '' part.
Finally, by 12.6 and 18.22, 
Proof: Follows from 16.5 and 18.23. 9
Lemma 18.4. The p i Á Y o are ®nitely additive; that is, if E f E g q, then
Proof: E f E g q and 18.1 yield E f r E X g . So by 18.21, j f r jX g djg, so j f jg q, so by 18.12, 18.33, and 14.4,
Lemma 18.5. Let gY f 1 Y f 2 Y F F F be an in®nite sequence of formulas such that E f 1 r E f 2 r Á Á Á and 18X51
Then for each individual i and state o,
Proof: By 18.21,
We claim that
If not, then the last inclusion in 18.54 is strict; that is, there is a n in jg that is not in any of the j f n . Set n X f f X n e j f g. Then n is a consistent and complete list of formulas ± i.e., a state in . This state contains g but none of the f n , contradicting 18.52; so 18.55 is proved. Then by 18.33, 18.54, 18.55 , and the countable additivity of the
Corollary 18.56. The de®nition (16.5) of p i Á Y o extends uniquely to a sadditive measure on F s .
Proof: By 18.14, the events E f form a ®eld. So, by Caratheodory's theorem, it su½ces to show that p i Á Y o is countably additive when restricted to events of the form E f ; i.e., that if E g 1 E g 2 Á Á Á E g and the E g m are mutually disjoint, then
To this end, set f n X g 1 R Á Á Á R g n , apply 18.5, 18.12, and 18.4, and conclude that
Lemma 18.6. p i Y o 1.
Proof: By completeness (16.2), each state contains x or X x, and so in any case x R X x. Therefore E xRX x , so by 11.9 and 13.23,
19. The canonical system satis®es the conditions for a knowledge-belief system
In this section we show that the canonical system satis®es the conditions set forth in Section 4 for knowledge-belief systems: That an individual's probabilities are concentrated on his information set (19.5); that he knows his own probabilities (19.6); and that everything in sight is F s -measurable (19.7 and 19.9). These four propositions establish Conditions (12.2) through (12.5) respectively. We will also ®nish establishing, in the current knowledge-belief context, the correspondence between syntax and semantics (19.2 and 19.4).
The knowledge and probability operators of i in the canonical system will be denoted K i and P i (see 12.1). As in the previous section, o denotes a state in the canonical system, Y jY o a model for o, p i Á Y o the probabilities of i in at o, K i and P i the knowledge and probability operators in . We use 18.22 and 14.4 repeatedly in this section, without explicit mention. 
in words, n is the list of all formulas that are true``at'' n.
it follows that also n e K i jh jk i h, so k i h e n by 19.11. If k i h e n, it may be seen similarly that k i h e o. So
n f j f and 19.21 yield f f n, so n f E f . But by de®nition, n e I i n I i o. So it is not the case that I i o is included in E f . This completes the proof of the opposite direction. 9 
Proposition 19.4. P i E f E p i f for rational . Proof: By 12.1 and 16.5, o e P i E f i¨ by 19.12 and 19.3 , this happens i¨p i f e o, which in turn is i¨o e E p i f . 9 Proposition 19.5. K i E r P 1 i E for all E in F s .
Proof: This says that
and there are only denumerably many formulas in o, it su½ces to show that
Since k i f e o, 1.8 and 12.2 yield o e jk i f
Proposition 19.6. P i E r K i P i E for all E in F s .
Proof: By 19.13, 19.2 and 19.4, we know that P i E r K i P i E when E is syntactic (i.e., of the form E f ). Now the proposition says that
Fix o and n such that k i o k i n. We know that p i EY o p i EY n when E is syntactic. Since the syntactic events form a ®eld, and this ®eld generates F s , it follows that any E in F s is approximable w.r.t. the sigma-additive measure
Proposition 19.7. Then atoms of the I i are F s -measurable.
Proof: Each atom of I i is of the form I i o for some o, and
Call a sequence E 1 Y E 2 Y F F F of events monotone if E 1 r E 2 r Á Á Á or E 1 s E 2 s Á Á Á Y set lim n3y E n X T n1 E n in the ®rst case and X U n1 E n in the second. Call a family g monotone if lim n3y E n e g whenever E 1 Y E 2 Y F F F is a monotone sequence in g.
Lemma 19.8 F s is the smallest monotone family that includes the ®eld F of all the E f .
Proof: This holds for all s-®elds F s generated by a ®eld F [Halmos 1950, p. 27, Theorem B] . 9
So when E E f , applying 19.4 yields fo X p i EY o g E p i f , which has the form E g and so is indeed in F s . Thus the family g of events satisfying 14.91 includes F. It is therefore su½cient, by 19.8, to show that it is a monotone family. So let E 1 Y E 2 Y F F F be a monotone sequence in g with limit E. If the sequence is non-decreasing, then
since E n e g. If the sequence is non-increasing, then
since E n e g. So E e g in both cases, so g is indeed monotone. 9
Discussion
(a) The meaning of the knowledge operators K i
As in the case of knowledge, the correct interpretation of the event K i E is that`E follows logically from the syntactic events6 that i knows.'' This follows from 8.51, which continues to hold ± with much the same proof as before ± in the context of this paper.
However, the analogue of 10.1 ± that knowledge of an in®nite disjunction is equivalent to knowledge of some ®nite subdisjunction ± is not correct here. For example,
, it says that i knows that j's probability for x is positive ± whereas the right side says that for some that is positive, i knows that j's probability for x is at least ± a much stronger statement. Unlike that of 8.51, the proof of 10.1 involves compactness arguments, which, because of the in®nitary nature of the logic, do not apply here.
(b) An alternative interpretation of the letters of the alphabet
The discussion at 10(b) continues to apply here, with little or no change.
(c) Knowledge-belief hierarchies
In 10(c) we saw that the hierarchy approach to knowledge, though more cumbersome and complicated than the syntactic approach, amounts to the same thing. The situation is similar with regard to knowledge-belief hierarchies.
Historically, the hierarchy approach originated with probability systems; see Armbruster and Bo È ge (1979) , Bo È ge and Eisele (1979) and Mertens and Zamir (1985) . These systems are pure probability systems; knowledge does not enter. For simplicity, we con®ne attention to the case of two players. Like at 10(c), we start with a set H of mutually exclusive and exhaustive``states of nature,'' which describe some aspect of reality (like tomorrow's temperature in Jerusalem) in terms not involving probability or knowledge. Then the hierarchy of a player i consists of the beliefs (probabilities) of i about the states of nature, i's probability distribution over the beliefs of the other player j about the states of nature, i's probability distribution over j's probability distributions over i's beliefs about the state of nature, and so on. Certain consistency conditions must be met. Moreover, j's probability distribution over i's beliefs about the states of nature may well be continuous; thus the next level of the hierarchy consists of a probability distribution over probability distributions, which requires selecting a topology on the space of probability distributions. So even without knowledge, matters quickly get rather complicated.
But knowledge is an intrinsic part of the picture, and should not be ignored. For example, a player necessarily knows his own probabilities, in the sense of absolute knowledge, not only in the sense of probability 1. The appropriate object to examine is a knowledge-belief hierarchy. In the case of two players, a pair of hierarchies (one for each player) looks roughly as follows: At the ®rst level, each player i has a knowledge-belief pro®le over the set H of states of nature; that is, he knows that the true state of nature is in a certain subset h i of H, and he has a probability distribution on h i . The knowledge of the two players must be consistent; one player cannot know something that the other knows to be false. At the second level of the hierarchy, each player has some knowledge and beliefs about pairs consisting of elements of H and the other player's ®rst-level knowledge and beliefs; these second-level knowledge-belief pro®les of the two players must be consistent with each other in a sense like that described for the ®rst level, and each player's second stage pro®le must also be consistent with his ®rst level pro®le (e.g., the ®rst level must be the marginal of the second level when projected onto the ®rst level). And so on, ad in®nitum. A more precise description, in the spirit of 10(c), would of course be far more complicated.
All this is accomplished much more brie¯y and elegantly by the syntactic approach. If o is a state of the world in the canonical knowledge-belief system , then k i o contains precisely the same information as i's hierarchy in the hierarchy approach. Just list all the formulas that i knows to be true ± which of course include all his probability assessments, all his probability assessments about others' probability assessments, and so on. No complicated consistency conditions, no topologies. Just a list of the formulas he knows, in no particular order.
As at 10(c), note that two states of the world o and o H are in the same element of i's partition of if and only if they correspond to the same knowledge-belief hierarchy of i. Thus i's knowledge-belief hierarchies correspond precisely to the atoms of his information partition; each can be read of rom the other. In particular, it follows that the knowledge-belief hierarchy of any one player determines precisely the common knowledge component of the true state of the world.
